

ONLINE APPENDIX

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A Theoretical framework

This appendix outlines a general model of social identity and relates it to judicial decisions in an ethnically heterogeneous society. The model attempts to capture empirical regularities documented in three well-established strands of research that study behavior in groups: the minimal group paradigm; public goods experiments; and the study of conformity.¹ A more thorough discussion of the model and the underlying evidence can be found in Shayo (2009).

Consider an economy with a set N of individuals and a given set G of *social groups*: $G = \{J | J \subseteq N \text{ is a social group}\}$. For the present purposes it suffices to say that a social group is not any arbitrary subset of the population but an existing category that individuals learn to recognize when living in a society. Denote by G_i the set of social groups to which individual i belongs: $G_i = \{J : J \in G \text{ and } i \in J\}$. We will say that an individual i *identifies* with group J if she prefers outcomes where (1) group J 's status is high and (2) her perceived distance from typical members of group J is low (we make the terms status and distance precise in equations 1 and 2 below). Specifically, let T be the set of outcomes of individuals' actions and let $\pi_i(t)$ be i 's material payoff from outcome $t \in T$ (e.g. i 's monetary transfer resulting from litigation). Let $S_J(t)$ be group J 's status and $d_{iJ}(t)$ be i 's perceived distance from group J .

Definition 1 *Individual i is said to identify with group J if her preferences over outcomes can be ordered by a utility function of the form:*

$$U_i(t; J) = u(\pi_i(t), S_J(t), d_{iJ}(t))$$

such that u is increasing in $S_J(t)$ and decreasing in $d_{iJ}(t)$.

Given this definition, identification is inferred from individual behavior by revealed preference.

Of course, people do not necessarily care about (or seek to resemble) members of any group they belong to. The following equilibrium concept attempts to capture the endogenous determination of the groups people identify with. For simplicity we assume that each individual identifies with a single group. Denote by A_i the set of actions available to individual i and suppose the outcome of individual actions is given by some function $f : A \rightarrow T$ (where $A = \times_{i \in N} A_i$ is the set of possible action profiles).

¹Standard two-person economic experiments (e.g. dictator, ultimatum and prisoner's dilemma games) have mostly abstracted from group-related issues. Recently, however, a number of studies began incorporating groups into the design of these games. Results, while still relatively scarce, are consistent with the social identity model proposed here. See Bernhard, Fischbacher, and Fehr (2006), Goette, Huffman, and Meier (2006), Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007), Fowler and Kam (2007), and Chen and Li (2009). Klor and Shayo (2010) study one component of the model in a political economy setting.

Definition 2 A *Social Identity Equilibrium (SIE)* is a profile of actions $a = (a_i)_{i \in N}$ and a profile of social identities $g = (g_i)_{i \in N}$ such that for all $i \in N$ we have $a_i \in A_i$, $g_i \in G_i$ and

$$U_i(f(a_i, a_{-i}); g_i) \geq U_i(f(a'_i, a_{-i}); g'_i)$$

for all $a'_i \in A_i$ and all $g'_i \in G_i$.

Thus, SIE requires not only that actions be optimal given what others are doing, but also that each individual’s social identity be optimal given her social environment. Specifically, an individual is more likely to identify with a group the higher is its social status and the smaller is the perceived distance between herself and that group.

So far, we have been rather vague about the meaning of perceived distance and status. We now offer specific ways to operationalize these concepts and provide some brief motivation for their role in Definition 2.

Perceived distance. People are less likely to categorize themselves into a given group the higher the difference they perceive between themselves and that group (Turner et al. 1987). A convenient way to model perceived difference is to use the notion of “distance in conceptual space” (e.g. Nosofsky 1986; Gärdenfors 2000). Each individual is characterized by a vector of attributes (or qualities) $q_i = (q_i^1, q_i^2, \dots, q_i^H)$. A social group is characterized by the “typical” attributes of its members, denoted q_J . For simplicity assume q_J is the mean across group members, i.e. $q_J = \frac{1}{|J|} \sum_{i \in J} q_i$. q_J is called the *prototype* of group J . The *perceived distance* between individual i and social group J is represented by a weighted Euclidean distance function:

$$d_{iJ} = \left(\sum_{h=1}^H w_h (q_i^h - q_J^h)^2 \right)^{1/2} \quad (1)$$

where $0 \leq w_h \leq 1$ and $\sum w_h = 1$. The w ’s are *attention weights* (Nosofsky 1986): the more salient is attribute h relative to other attributes, the more attention is devoted to it, which is captured by a higher w_h .

This specification allows the social environment to affect perceived distances in two distinct ways. First, distances may change as the attributes of the agents (namely the values of q_i and q_J) change. For example, the higher the fraction of people in a group that speak my language, the more similar I perceive myself to that group. Second – and this is the effect studied in this paper – perceived distances can change as the attention paid to the various dimensions changes, e.g. as ethnicity becomes more salient relative to other attributes.

As a specific example, consider a binary attribute – call it attribute e – shared by all members of group J and only by them. For concreteness think of e as a specific ethnicity

and of J as the ethnic group. That is $q_i^e = 1$ if $i \in J$ and $q_i^e = 0$ otherwise. This means that $q_i^e - q_j^e = 0$ for all members of J . Suppose that there are also other attributes (e.g. rich/poor) which characterize some but not all members of J , such that $q_i^h \neq q_j^h$ for $i \in J$ and some attribute h . From equation (1) we know that in this case $d_{iJ} > 0$ for $i \in J$. Now, consider an exogenous increase in the salience of attribute e , reducing the salience of all other attributes (w_e increases while w_h decreases for all $h \neq e$). This means an increase in the attention paid to an attribute shared by all group members and a decrease in the attention paid to other attributes, which implies that d_{iJ} decreases.

Group status. Studies in social psychology argue that the evaluation of a group is often performed by social comparisons to other groups along valued dimensions of comparisons (Tajfel and Turner 1986). In our setting, one such dimension is material payoffs. Thus, we can think of group status in terms similar to standard treatments of individual status in economics. That is, we can represent the status of group J as a function

$$S_J(t) = \mathcal{S}_J(\bar{\pi}_J(t), \bar{\pi}_{-J}(t)), \quad (2)$$

where $\bar{\pi}_J$ is the mean material payoff of individuals that belong to group J and $-J$ is the reference-group of group J (which in a two-group setting is simply the other group). We assume that the status of group J is strictly increasing in $\bar{\pi}_J$ and is weakly decreasing in $\bar{\pi}_{-J}$.² Given equation (2), identification with a group implies caring about the material payoffs of other group members.

Application to Judicial decisions

The above model is grounded primarily in results from lab experiments that document behavior in groups. This paper attempts to shed light on two major implications of the model in naturally occurring data. First, that members of a social group may behave in a way that takes into account the payoffs of other members of their group. Second, that such behavior is more likely to be observed when group-specific attributes become salient.

Consider a judge who is also a member of some ethnic group. The judge is faced with a plaintiff and a defendant, and needs to decide the outcome of the trial, namely the monetary transfer t from defendant to plaintiff (which could be negative). The material payoffs of the

²If the status function is constant in $\bar{\pi}_{-J}$, group J 's status depends on the group's mean absolute, rather than relative, payoff. As our data consist of decisions that transfer money from an ingroup member to an outgroup member, we cannot distinguish in this paper between actions that enhance relative and absolute group payoffs.

litigants are then simply:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{\text{plaintiff}} &= t \\ \pi_{\text{defendant}} &= -t.\end{aligned}$$

The judge’s own material payoff is not directly affected by her ruling, but one might suspect that wrong decisions can entail loss of utility for various reasons (e.g. the existence of strong non-discriminatory norms or reduced prospects of promotion). Denoting by \hat{t} the “correct” decision, we write

$$\pi_{\text{judge}} = -(t - \hat{t})^2.$$

Let $E, E' \in G$ be two ethnic groups that partition N . Let $q_i^e = 1$ if $i \in E$ and $q_i^e = 0$ otherwise, and denote by w_e the associated attention weight. As in the example above, assume that the groups are not homogeneous, i.e. there are attributes which characterize some but not all members of each group. Finally, assume that attributes and attention weights are not affected by the judicial decision. Denoting by t^* the transfer determined by the judge, we make two observations.

Observation 1 *Suppose plaintiff $\in E$ and defendant $\in E'$. Then $t^* > \hat{t}$ if the judge identifies with group E ; and $t^* < \hat{t}$ if the judge identifies with group E' .*

Observation 2 *The higher is the relative salience of ethnicity (w_e), the more likely it is that in equilibrium the judge identifies with her ethnic group.*

Using Observation 1, Section 4 in the paper examines the extent of ethnic identification among judges. Section 5 examines Observation 2.

B Coding litigant ethnicity

This appendix describes the procedure we use to code litigant ethnicity. The legal documents do not consistently order first and last names. We therefore decompose each litigant name into its components (separated by spaces) such as “Abraham” + “Benjamin” + “Cohen”. There may be up to four such components. We do not impose any assumption regarding the gender of the litigant, nor whether a particular component represents a first, middle or last name. Using an external database derived from the Israel Population Registry, we compute for each component the following conditional probabilities of it being an Arab name:³

³In our calculations below we assume that all litigants are either Arab or Jewish (without distinguishing between subgroups). According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, at the end of 2002 76.8% of the Israeli population were Jewish and 19.1% were Arab. The rest are classified as “other”: these are mostly immigrants from the Former Soviet Union who are not formally classified as Jewish.

$$\begin{aligned}
p_{fm} &= p(\text{Arab}|\text{first name and male}) \\
p_{ff} &= p(\text{Arab}|\text{first name and female}) \\
p_{lm} &= p(\text{Arab}|\text{last name and male}) \\
p_{lf} &= p(\text{Arab}|\text{last name and female}).
\end{aligned}$$

A name component is designated “Arab” if $\max\{p_{fm}, p_{ff}, p_{lm}, p_{lf}\} > 0.95$ and $\min\{p_{fm}, p_{ff}, p_{lm}, p_{lf}\} > 0.05$. That is, we designate a component as Arab if at least one of the conditional probabilities is very high (i.e., the name component is highly likely to belong to an Arab individual) and none of the conditional probabilities is very low (that is, none of the conditional probabilities suggests that the name component is highly likely to belong to a Jewish individual). Similarly, a component is designated “Jewish” if $\min\{p_{fm}, p_{ff}, p_{lm}, p_{lf}\} \leq 0.05$ and $\max\{p_{fm}, p_{ff}, p_{lm}, p_{lf}\} \leq 0.95$.

A litigant is coded as Arab if at least one of his or her name components is designated as “Arab” and *none* of the other components is designated as “Jewish”. Similarly, a litigant is coded as Jewish if at least one of his or her name components is designated as “Jewish” and *none* of the other components is designated as “Arab”. This procedure assigns an ethnicity to the vast majority of private litigants (50,294 out of 53,029). The fact that the share of names that are not assigned an ethnicity is very small is consistent with the fact that in Israel there is little overlap in naming conventions across ethnicities and there are virtually no marriages across ethnic lines.⁴ To assign ethnicity to the remaining litigants we search for their names in an electronic directory service. This allows us to locate the exact addresses of people bearing these names. Relying on the fact that in Israel Arabs and Jews tend to live in different communities (either different towns and villages, or different neighborhoods within integrated towns), we are able to assign ethnicities to almost all litigants. The few remaining cases are not coded.

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⁴For example, in the data derived from the Israel Population Registry, 62.5% of first names are exclusively Jewish (i.e. the empirical probability that the name is associated with an Arab citizen is zero). At the same time, 28.2% of first names are exclusively Arab (i.e. the empirical probability that the name is associated with an Arab citizen is one).

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TABLE C.1
CLAIMS WITHDRAWN AND SETTLED OUTSIDE COURT

Dependent variable	Claim withdrawn		Claim settled outside court		Claim withdrawn or settled outside court	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Arab plaintiff	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.014)	0.003 (0.013)	-0.025 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.014)
Arab judge	0.037* (0.020)		0.056 (0.060)		0.093 (0.067)	
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	-0.004 (0.012)	0.004 (0.014)	0.006 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.019)	0.002 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.020)
Court fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Case characteristics	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Time controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,919	1,919	1,919	1,919	1,919	1,919
R-squared	0.0107	0.2385	0.0135	0.5156	0.0245	0.6118

Notes: Regressions were estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are reported in parentheses. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C.2
JUDICIAL INGROUP BIAS: TRAFFIC CASES

<i>Dependent variable: claim accepted</i>		
	All	Traffic
Arab plaintiff	-0.117*** (0.031)	-0.099** (0.041)
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.192*** (0.049)	0.185*** (0.054)
Court fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	Yes	Yes
Case characteristics	Yes	Yes
Time controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,748	1,205
R-squared	0.248	0.234

Notes: Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are reported in parentheses. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent

TABLE C.3
JUDICIAL INGROUP BIAS: COURTS WITH IMMEDIATE
JUDGE ASSIGNMENT

<i>Dependent variable: claim accepted</i>		
	All courts	Courts with immediate judge assignment
Arab plaintiff	-0.117 ^{***} (0.031)	-0.111 ^{***} (0.041)
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.192 ^{***} (0.049)	0.214 ^{***} (0.073)
Court fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	Yes	Yes
Case characteristics	Yes	Yes
Time controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,748	1,190
R-squared	0.248	0.265

Notes: Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are reported in parentheses. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C.4
BALANCING TESTS FOR ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGES IN THE PRESENCE OF TERRORISM

	Mean	Civilian fatalities			Total fatalities			Obs.
		Natural Area	Sub-District	District	Natural Area	Sub-District	District	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Arab plaintiff	0.438	0.224** [0.111]	0.170 [0.130]	0.147 [0.162]	0.194* [0.102]	0.172 [0.116]	0.093 [0.119]	1,744
Number of plaintiffs	1.113 (0.318)	-0.043 [0.072]	-0.050 [0.085]	-0.033 [0.106]	-0.037 [0.066]	-0.030 [0.076]	-0.004 [0.078]	1,744
Number of defendants	1.724 (0.713)	0.098 [0.160]	0.183 [0.189]	0.191 [0.235]	0.056 [0.147]	0.131 [0.168]	0.055 [0.173]	1,744
Private plaintiffs (share of total)	0.998 (0.031)	0.008 [0.006]	0.002 [0.007]	0.006 [0.009]	0.008 [0.006]	0.004 [0.006]	0.006 [0.007]	1,744
Private defendants (share of total)	0.737 (0.258)	0.038 [0.058]	-0.002 [0.068]	0.014 [0.085]	0.040 [0.053]	0.004 [0.061]	0.025 [0.062]	1,744
Male plaintiffs (share of private plaintiffs)	0.821 (0.364)	0.035 [0.083]	0.037 [0.098]	0.134 [0.122]	0.045 [0.077]	0.032 [0.087]	0.094 [0.090]	1,744
Male defendants (share of private defendants)	0.875 (0.313)	0.100 [0.072]	0.005 [0.084]	0.038 [0.105]	0.084 [0.066]	0.007 [0.075]	0.046 [0.077]	1,744
Claim subject - Breach of sales contract	0.032	-0.017 [0.040]	-0.011 [0.047]	0.013 [0.059]	-0.011 [0.037]	-0.010 [0.042]	0.017 [0.043]	1,744
Claim subject - Breach of service contract	0.095	-0.026 [0.067]	-0.064 [0.079]	-0.008 [0.098]	-0.033 [0.061]	-0.057 [0.070]	-0.016 [0.072]	1,744
Claim subject - Housing related	0.011	0.017 [0.023]	0.023 [0.028]	0.041 [0.034]	0.012 [0.022]	0.013 [0.025]	0.023 [0.025]	1,744
Claim subject - Private conflict	0.013	0.086*** [0.026]	0.124*** [0.031]	0.160*** [0.038]	0.090*** [0.024]	0.120*** [0.027]	0.137*** [0.028]	1,744
Claim subject - Traffic accident	0.689	-0.098 [0.100]	-0.001 [0.118]	-0.099 [0.147]	-0.110 [0.092]	0.011 [0.105]	-0.105 [0.108]	1,744
Claim subject - Miscellaneous	0.013	0.011 [0.026]	0.015 [0.030]	0.058 [0.038]	0.011 [0.024]	0.010 [0.027]	0.056** [0.028]	1,744
Claim subject - Missing	0.147	0.027 [0.075]	-0.087 [0.088]	-0.165 [0.109]	0.041 [0.068]	-0.087 [0.078]	-0.112 [0.008]	1,744
Defense present	0.866	-0.037 [0.071]	0.073 [0.084]	0.125 [0.104]	-0.051 [0.065]	0.069 [0.075]	0.088 [0.077]	1,744
Defense made a counter claim	0.088	0.004 [0.065]	0.016 [0.076]	0.032 [0.095]	-0.019 [0.059]	-0.024 [0.068]	-0.043 [0.070]	1,744
Compensation requested (NIS)	6,424 (5,085)	1,298 [2,022]	2,232 [2,822]	2,822 [3,580]	898 [1,866]	1,401 [2,560]	938 [2,823]	658

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses in column (1). Standard errors in brackets in columns (2)-(7). Each entry in columns (2)-(7) is derived from a separate OLS regression where the explanatory variables are: (1) an indicator for Arab judge; (2) the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population; (3) an interaction between the Arab judge indicator and the number of fatalities; and (4) court fixed effects. The Table reports the coefficient on the interaction term (3), which represents the differential effect of terrorism intensity on the characteristics of cases assigned to an Arab versus a Jewish judge.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C.5
TERRORISM AND CLAIMS WITHDRAWN

<i>Dependent variable: claim withdrawn</i>							
	Civilian fatalities			Total fatalities			
		Natural Area	Sub- District	District	Natural Area	Sub- District	District
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Arab plaintiff	-0.005 (0.010)	0.002 (0.012)	0.006 (0.013)	0.009 (0.014)	0.003 (0.012)	0.006 (0.012)	0.009 (0.013)
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.004 (0.014)	0.006 (0.018)	0.025 (0.017)	0.024 (0.020)	0.005 (0.019)	0.026 (0.018)	0.020 (0.021)
Fatalities		0.013 (0.018)	0.016 (0.021)	0.024 (0.037)	0.015 (0.014)	0.013 (0.014)	0.034 (0.026)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff		-0.021 (0.021)	-0.036 (0.027)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.039* (0.023)
Fatalities * Arab judge		0.020 (0.060)	-0.072 (0.057)	0.011 (0.074)	0.029 (0.054)	-0.059 (0.048)	0.019 (0.038)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff * Arab judge		-0.022 (0.051)	-0.111** (0.048)	-0.149* (0.088)	-0.020 (0.051)	-0.107** (0.047)	-0.097 (0.084)
Court fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,919	1,914	1,914	1,914	1,914	1,914	1,914
R-squared	0.238	0.239	0.244	0.242	0.240	0.244	0.242

Notes: "Fatalities" is the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C.6
TERRORISM AND CLAIMS SETTLED OUTSIDE COURT

<i>Dependent variable: claim settled outside court</i>							
	Civilian fatalities			Total fatalities			
		Natural Area	Sub- District	District	Natural Area	Sub- District	District
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Arab plaintiff	0.003 (0.013)	0.005 (0.020)	0.001 (0.022)	0.002 (0.027)	0.004 (0.020)	0.000 (0.022)	0.001 (0.025)
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	-0.010 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.030)	-0.034 (0.033)	-0.039 (0.037)	-0.009 (0.030)	-0.033 (0.032)	-0.033 (0.036)
Fatalities		0.005 (0.021)	0.014 (0.036)	0.009 (0.046)	-0.000 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.033)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff		-0.006 (0.029)	0.004 (0.044)	0.001 (0.060)	-0.002 (0.026)	0.007 (0.032)	0.004 (0.043)
Fatalities * Arab judge		-0.017 (0.060)	0.021 (0.058)	0.025 (0.091)	-0.014 (0.053)	0.033 (0.045)	0.025 (0.054)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff * Arab judge		0.001 (0.086)	0.120 (0.096)	0.169 (0.145)	-0.005 (0.077)	0.102 (0.087)	0.108 (0.113)
Court fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,919	1,914	1,914	1,914	1,914	1,914	1,914
R-squared	0.516	0.512	0.513	0.513	0.512	0.513	0.513

Notes: "Fatalities" is the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week.
*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C.7
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN JUDGE AGE, PLAINTIFF ETHNICITY AND TERRORISM INTENSITY

<i>Dependent variable: claim accepted</i>						
	Civilian fatalities			Total fatalities		
	Natural Area	Sub-District	District	Natural Area	Sub-District	District
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Arab plaintiff	-0.023 (0.121)	0.052 (0.131)	-0.173 (0.155)	-0.012 (0.123)	0.094 (0.129)	-0.099 (0.149)
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.115* (0.062)	0.077 (0.070)	0.127* (0.071)	0.111* (0.064)	0.070 (0.073)	0.137* (0.077)
Arab plaintiff * Judge age	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
<hr/>						
Fatalities	0.229* (0.126)	0.130 (0.187)	-0.129 (0.260)	0.225* (0.121)	0.136 (0.163)	-0.055 (0.156)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff	0.022 (0.256)	-0.198 (0.355)	0.457 (0.399)	-0.032 (0.203)	-0.285 (0.261)	0.183 (0.254)
Fatalities * Arab judge	-0.194 (0.126)	-0.144 (0.154)	-0.181 (0.166)	-0.177 (0.113)	-0.122 (0.129)	-0.093 (0.089)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.231* (0.117)	0.381** (0.155)	0.274* (0.163)	0.224** (0.105)	0.355** (0.142)	0.153 (0.127)
<hr/>						
Fatalities * Judge age	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Fatalities * Judge age * Arab judge	-0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.011* (0.007)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
<hr/>						
Court fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744
R-squared	0.248	0.247	0.248	0.248	0.247	0.246

Notes: "Fatalities" is the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C.8
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN JUDGE TENURE, PLAINTIFF ETHNICITY AND TERRORISM INTENSITY

<i>Dependent variable: claim accepted</i>						
	Civilian fatalities			Total fatalities		
	Natural Area	Sub-District	District	Natural Area	Sub-District	District
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Arab plaintiff	-0.076 (0.048)	-0.062 (0.050)	-0.094* (0.056)	-0.074 (0.049)	-0.056 (0.052)	-0.094 (0.058)
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.123** (0.054)	0.095 (0.061)	0.117* (0.061)	0.122** (0.056)	0.093 (0.064)	0.138** (0.066)
Arab plaintiff * Judge tenure	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)
<hr/>						
Fatalities	0.111* (0.056)	0.051 (0.088)	0.019 (0.118)	0.100* (0.054)	0.056 (0.076)	-0.004 (0.084)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff	-0.069 (0.074)	-0.116 (0.112)	-0.030 (0.118)	-0.068 (0.069)	-0.118 (0.100)	-0.016 (0.092)
Fatalities * Arab judge	-0.184 (0.126)	-0.137 (0.153)	-0.203 (0.165)	-0.164 (0.111)	-0.117 (0.127)	-0.101 (0.089)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.239** (0.095)	0.366*** (0.132)	0.329** (0.137)	0.224** (0.087)	0.330*** (0.123)	0.170 (0.115)
<hr/>						
Fatalities * Judge tenure	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
Fatalities * Judge tenure * Arab judge	-0.004 (0.006)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)
<hr/>						
Court fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744
R-squared	0.248	0.247	0.247	0.248	0.247	0.246

Notes: "Fatalities" is the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C.9
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN JUDGE GENDER, PLAINTIFF ETHNICITY AND TERRORISM INTENSITY

	<i>Dependent variable: claim accepted</i>					
	Civilian fatalities			Total fatalities		
	Natural Area	Sub-District	District	Natural Area	Sub-District	District
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Arab plaintiff	-0.020 (0.044)	0.006 (0.042)	-0.016 (0.049)	-0.016 (0.046)	0.013 (0.045)	-0.011 (0.054)
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.114** (0.045)	0.097** (0.048)	0.096* (0.055)	0.110** (0.048)	0.091* (0.050)	0.113* (0.058)
Arab plaintiff * Male judge	-0.127*** (0.048)	-0.182*** (0.049)	-0.127** (0.059)	-0.131*** (0.049)	-0.191*** (0.048)	-0.152** (0.059)
<hr/>						
Fatalities	0.049 (0.061)	0.036 (0.123)	0.043 (0.157)	0.043 (0.062)	0.057 (0.091)	0.033 (0.116)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff	-0.127 (0.079)	-0.233*** (0.083)	-0.159* (0.082)	-0.127* (0.070)	-0.229*** (0.060)	-0.150** (0.063)
Fatalities * Arab judge	-0.132 (0.108)	-0.083 (0.144)	-0.197 (0.167)	-0.107 (0.103)	-0.077 (0.128)	-0.109 (0.106)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.251** (0.097)	0.324*** (0.101)	0.379*** (0.145)	0.239*** (0.087)	0.310*** (0.070)	0.233** (0.101)
<hr/>						
Fatalities * Male judge	0.032 (0.074)	-0.036 (0.116)	-0.005 (0.148)	-0.000 (0.069)	-0.073 (0.084)	-0.051 (0.100)
Fatalities * Male judge * Arab judge	0.093 (0.101)	0.298** (0.146)	0.095 (0.188)	0.100 (0.084)	0.284*** (0.081)	0.163 (0.116)
<hr/>						
Court fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744
R-squared	0.250	0.251	0.249	0.250	0.251	0.249

Notes: "Fatalities" is the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C.10

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN JUDGE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION, PLAINTIFF ETHNICITY AND TERRORISM INTENSITY

<i>Dependent variable: claim accepted</i>						
	Civilian fatalities			Total fatalities		
	Natural Area	Sub-District	District	Natural Area	Sub-District	District
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Arab plaintiff	-0.095** (0.039)	-0.094** (0.045)	-0.119** (0.051)	-0.096** (0.041)	-0.091** (0.045)	-0.113** (0.052)
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.120** (0.051)	0.115* (0.059)	0.121* (0.062)	0.123** (0.053)	0.121* (0.064)	0.142** (0.068)
Arab plaintiff * Judge HU	0.031 (0.052)	0.004 (0.059)	0.061 (0.063)	0.028 (0.054)	-0.014 (0.061)	0.040 (0.067)
Fatalities	0.115** (0.052)	0.036 (0.100)	0.015 (0.135)	0.100** (0.048)	0.028 (0.085)	-0.019 (0.085)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff	-0.009 (0.075)	-0.027 (0.149)	0.077 (0.153)	-0.006 (0.069)	-0.036 (0.123)	0.037 (0.092)
Fatalities * Arab judge	-0.142 (0.138)	-0.114 (0.154)	-0.207 (0.174)	-0.129 (0.117)	-0.086 (0.129)	-0.097 (0.088)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.295*** (0.092)	0.342** (0.134)	0.304* (0.174)	0.253*** (0.082)	0.279** (0.122)	0.155 (0.135)
Fatalities * Judge HU	-0.117 (0.076)	-0.033 (0.114)	0.014 (0.154)	-0.101* (0.058)	-0.024 (0.085)	0.031 (0.088)
Fatalities * Judge HU * Arab judge	-0.189* (0.108)	-0.108 (0.165)	-0.306 (0.192)	-0.151 (0.091)	-0.025 (0.135)	-0.189 (0.126)
Court fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744
R-squared	0.250	0.247	0.248	0.250	0.247	0.247

Notes: "Judge HU" is an indicator for whether judge attained LLB at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. "Fatalities" is the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C.11

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN JUDGE HIGHEST DEGREE, PLAINTIFF ETHNICITY AND TERRORISM INTENSITY

<i>Dependent variable: claim accepted</i>						
	Civilian fatalities			Total fatalities		
	Natural Area	Sub-District	District	Natural Area	Sub-District	District
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Arab plaintiff	-0.081** (0.036)	-0.088** (0.038)	-0.086** (0.042)	-0.078** (0.037)	-0.090** (0.040)	-0.090** (0.043)
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.134*** (0.049)	0.115** (0.057)	0.113* (0.060)	0.130** (0.051)	0.119* (0.060)	0.132** (0.064)
Arab plaintiff * Judge>LLB	-0.074 (0.046)	-0.039 (0.053)	0.008 (0.065)	-0.075 (0.047)	-0.035 (0.055)	0.016 (0.079)
<hr/>						
Fatalities	0.075 (0.046)	0.015 (0.069)	0.026 (0.114)	0.050 (0.040)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.008 (0.072)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff	-0.073 (0.059)	-0.062 (0.084)	-0.063 (0.104)	-0.070 (0.048)	-0.043 (0.054)	-0.037 (0.070)
Fatalities * Arab judge	-0.143 (0.125)	-0.097 (0.147)	-0.195 (0.165)	-0.114 (0.106)	-0.070 (0.119)	-0.096 (0.084)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.226** (0.088)	0.309** (0.119)	0.344** (0.148)	0.215*** (0.076)	0.260** (0.100)	0.187 (0.113)
<hr/>						
Fatalities * Judge>LLB	-0.030 (0.111)	0.028 (0.192)	0.097 (0.195)	0.012 (0.113)	0.120 (0.233)	0.199 (0.207)
Fatalities * Judge>LLB * Arab judge	-0.104 (0.129)	-0.295*** (0.105)	-0.470** (0.216)	-0.108 (0.123)	-0.307*** (0.090)	-0.510** (0.233)
<hr/>						
Court fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744
R-squared	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248

Notes: "Judge>LLB" is an indicator for whether judge has a master or PhD degree. "Fatalities" is the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C.12
FULL SET OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN JUDGE CHARACTERISTICS, PLAINTIFF ETHNICITY AND
TERRORISM INTENSITY[†]

<i>Dependent variable: claim accepted</i>						
	Civilian fatalities			Total fatalities		
	Natural Area	Sub-District	District	Natural Area	Sub-District	District
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Arab plaintiff	-0.052 (0.211)	-0.065 (0.236)	-0.276 (0.258)	-0.044 (0.211)	-0.016 (0.234)	-0.122 (0.276)
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.114 (0.069)	0.117 (0.072)	0.126 (0.084)	0.114 (0.072)	0.108 (0.074)	0.114 (0.093)
Fatalities	-0.016 (0.323)	-0.384 (0.430)	-0.629 (0.430)	-0.084 (0.295)	-0.420 (0.382)	-0.355 (0.370)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff	0.371 (0.697)	0.236 (0.759)	1.199* (0.709)	0.275 (0.611)	0.006 (0.652)	0.311 (0.603)
Fatalities * Arab judge	-0.105 (0.118)	-0.011 (0.158)	-0.091 (0.194)	-0.089 (0.111)	-0.004 (0.138)	-0.055 (0.126)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.186 (0.156)	0.195 (0.140)	0.158 (0.153)	0.173 (0.145)	0.210* (0.123)	0.168 (0.127)
Additional interactions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Court fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744
R-squared	0.255	0.254	0.255	0.254	0.254	0.254

[†] Notice that the difference between judge age and tenure is constant for each judge. To mitigate the resulting co-linearity, the next table (C.13) has a full set of interactions, excluding interactions with judge age.

Notes: "Fatalities" is the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C.13
FULL SET OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN JUDGE CHARACTERISTICS (EXCLUDING AGE), PLAINTIFF
ETHNICITY AND TERRORISM INTENSITY

<i>Dependent variable: claim accepted</i>						
	Civilian fatalities			Total fatalities		
	Natural Area	Sub-District	District	Natural Area	Sub-District	District
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Arab plaintiff	-0.039 (0.051)	-0.002 (0.053)	-0.041 (0.068)	-0.034 (0.054)	0.014 (0.056)	-0.015 (0.073)
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.110** (0.050)	0.109** (0.053)	0.095 (0.061)	0.110** (0.052)	0.102* (0.054)	0.097 (0.065)
Fatalities	0.079 (0.065)	0.061 (0.132)	0.054 (0.164)	0.074 (0.070)	0.080 (0.110)	0.032 (0.122)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff	-0.037 (0.098)	-0.160 (0.120)	-0.055 (0.141)	-0.047 (0.089)	-0.190** (0.095)	-0.122 (0.092)
Fatalities * Arab judge	-0.119 (0.112)	-0.073 (0.151)	-0.170 (0.189)	-0.113 (0.104)	-0.076 (0.131)	-0.103 (0.119)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.251*** (0.095)	0.242** (0.115)	0.289** (0.127)	0.225** (0.090)	0.237** (0.098)	0.219** (0.087)
Additional interactions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Court fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744
R-squared	0.255	0.254	0.254	0.254	0.254	0.253

Notes: "Fatalities" is the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C.14
TERRORISM AND JUDICIAL BIAS: USING DUMMY FATALITY VARIABLES[†]

<i>Dependent variable: claim accepted</i>							
	(1)	Civilian fatalities			Total fatalities		
		Natural Area	Sub-District	District	Natural Area	Sub-District	District
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Arab plaintiff	-0.117*** (0.031)	-0.047 (0.041)	-0.037 (0.065)	-0.122 (0.093)	-0.034 (0.041)	-0.003 (0.078)	-0.073 (0.155)
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.192*** (0.049)	0.070 (0.055)	0.091 (0.094)	0.178* (0.104)	0.036 (0.062)	0.086 (0.100)	-0.073 (0.157)
Fatalities		0.057 (0.038)	0.069 (0.052)	0.098 (0.064)	0.057 (0.038)	0.106** (0.052)	0.181* (0.101)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff		-0.098* (0.052)	-0.095 (0.072)	0.005 (0.099)	-0.113** (0.052)	-0.131 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.157)
Fatalities * Arab judge		0.029 (0.121)	-0.087 (0.070)	-0.134 (0.088)	-0.102 (0.102)	-0.154* (0.085)	0.164 (0.126)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff * Arab judge		0.201** (0.078)	0.122 (0.110)	0.020 (0.112)	0.230*** (0.077)	0.126 (0.103)	0.268* (0.160)
Court fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,748	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744
R-squared	0.248	0.248	0.246	0.247	0.248	0.248	0.252

[†] Notice in Table C.15 below that once we go beyond the natural area, there is very little variation in the dummy fatality variables, as the vast majority of cases in this period had some fatalities in the sub-district or district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision. This yields imprecise estimates of the effect of terrorism intensity on ingroup bias at the sub-district and district levels.

Notes: "Fatalities" is a dummy variable that take the value of 1 if the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial was positive. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.

TABLE C.15
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DUMMY FATALITY VARIABLES
(N=1,744)

Type	Area	Mean
Civilian	Natural area	0.5923
	Sub-district	0.8056
	District	0.8744
Total	Natural area	0.6628
	Sub-district	0.8567
	District	0.9518

TABLE C.16
EXPLORING LITIGANT BEHAVIOR: DEFENSE PRESENT IN COURT AND STATEMENT SUBMITTED

<i>Dependent variable: "defense present" indicator</i>							
	Civilian fatalities				Total fatalities		
		Natural Area	Sub- District	District	Natural Area	Sub- District	District
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Arab plaintiff	0.004 (0.008)	0.010 (0.011)	0.014 (0.013)	0.013 (0.013)	0.009 (0.011)	0.010 (0.012)	0.010 (0.012)
Arab plaintiff * Arab judge	0.001 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.001 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.019)	0.002 (0.021)	0.005 (0.021)
Fatalities		-0.018 (0.018)	-0.024 (0.032)	-0.047* (0.029)	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.019 (0.026)	-0.043* (0.025)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff		-0.018 (0.021)	-0.035 (0.029)	-0.032 (0.029)	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.024)	-0.019 (0.023)
Fatalities * Arab judge		-0.085 (0.061)	-0.063 (0.068)	-0.073 (0.079)	-0.076 (0.053)	-0.056 (0.058)	-0.036 (0.048)
Fatalities * Arab plaintiff * Arab judge		0.022 (0.048)	0.025 (0.060)	-0.009 (0.064)	0.011 (0.043)	-0.003 (0.052)	-0.023 (0.045)
Court fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge fixed effects and tenure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,748	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744
R-squared	0.862	0.863	0.863	0.863	0.863	0.863	0.863

Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether a defense statement was submitted and the defendant(s) appeared in the trial. "Fatalities" is the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week.

*, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.