**ONLINE APPENDIX**

**Conflict and the Persistence of Ethnic Bias**

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**Appendix A: Data collection, coding and summary statistics**

1. **Data on judicial decisions**

As mentioned in the body of the paper, our main source of data is online transcripts of judicial decisions (rulings). These documents first became available online in late 2000 in a handful of courts and over time coverage widened. Online coverage effectively stopped in 2005 and resumed only in 2007. We cover the universe of available documents: 26,444 from 2000–2004 and 28,576 from 2007–2010. Each document records the names of the judge and the litigants and typically includes several paragraphs that sketch the arguments made by the litigants and the ruling made by the judge. For the full set of available documents, we code whether each of the litigants is a private citizen, a business, or a government agency.

If the litigant is private, we code his or her ethnicity (Arab or Jewish) using a procedure detailed the next section of this appendix. In short, coding ethnicity employs a dataset derived from the Israel Population Registry which allows us to compute the likelihood of any first and family name being associated with an Arab or Jewish citizen. The accuracy of this procedure follows from the fact (apparent in data derived from the Registry) that there is very little overlap between Jewish and Arab names. Consistent with the ethnic breakdown reported in the body of the paper, we assume that all litigants are either Arab or Jewish. We cannot distinguish between sub-groups (e.g., Christian vs. Muslim Arabs and Ashkenazi vs. Sephardi Jews).

Having coded litigants' ethnicities for all available documents, we keep only “mixed cases”: those where at least one private plaintiff and one private defendant are of different ethnicities (N=4,038). For these cases we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the documents. Each document is coded independently by two different coders. A third (senior) coder verifies the coding and adjudicates cases where there is an incompatibility across coders in any of the fields.

For the mixed cases, we extract data on (a) court; (b) judge's name (which we use to obtain biographical information); (c) litigants (in addition to information about type – private, business or a government agency – and ethnicity, we use the wording of the decision document and litigants' names to code gender); (d) claim subject (e.g., breach of contract, traffic accident, etc.); (e) timing of decision; (f) monetary compensation requested by the plaintiff and whether a counterclaim was filed; (g) whether the claim was settled outside the court or withdrawn; and (h) monetary transfers (if any), including legal expenses.

The main analysis in this paper excludes cases that were settled outside the court (325 cases) or withdrawn (303) as well as cases that have multiple plaintiffs (or defendants) such that one plaintiff (or defendant) is Jewish and another is Arab (305). Finally, we exclude cases where the court is located in the Occupied Territories (1). This leaves us with 3,153 cases, 1,748 for 2000–2004 and 1,405 for 2007–2010.

Our main measure of trial outcome is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the claim was accepted and zero otherwise. Out of the 3,153 cases in our main sample, 2,300 (73%) are coded as accepted. We also construct several alternative outcome measures. The first attempts to distinguish between claims that were partly or fully accepted. This distinction is not straightforward: while in all cases we have information on the monetary compensation awarded by the judge, in more than 60% of the cases we do not know the sum requested. Nonetheless, we can sometimes deduce from the wording of the decision that the claim was "fully accepted." This yields an ordered categorical variable that takes three values: rejected (coded 0), partly accepted (1), or fully accepted (2). A second alternative measure of trial outcome is the monetary compensation awarded by the judge to the plaintiff net of the compensation awarded to the defendant (in case there was a counterclaim). A third alternative measure is the legal expenses awarded to the plaintiff net of the expenses awarded to the defendant. Finally, we look at the ratio between the net monetary compensation awarded by the judge to the plaintiff (inclusive of legal expenses) and the sum requested by the plaintiff.

Judges’ ethnicities are coded using the same name-based procedure applied to the litigants. The main source for socio-demographic information on the judges is their biographies. Most biographies are available online; the rest were obtained from the court system using freedom of information procedures. We also collect data on judges’ employment histories as explained below. Overall, our main sample has 240 judges, 30 of whom are Arab.

1. **Coding ethnicity**

This section details the procedure we use to code litigant (and judge) ethnicity. The legal documents do not consistently order first and last names. We therefore decompose each litigant name into its components (separated by spaces) such as Abraham+Benjamin+Cohen. There may be up to four such components. We do not impose any assumption regarding the gender of the litigant, nor whether a particular component represents a first, middle or last name. Using an external database derived from the Israel Population Registry, we compute for each component the following conditional probabilities of it being an Arab name:[[1]](#footnote-1)



A name component is designated Arab if:

 and .

That is, we designate a component as Arab if at least one of the conditional probabilities is very high (i.e., the name component is highly likely to belong to an Arab individual) and none of the conditional probabilities is very low (that is, none of the conditional probabilities suggests that the name component is highly likely to belong to a Jewish individual).

Similarly, a name component is designated Jewish if:

 and 

A litigant is coded as Arab if at least one of his or her name components is designated as Arab and *none* of the other components is designated as Jewish. Similarly, a litigant is coded as Jewish if at least one of his or her name components is designated as Jewish and *none* of the other components is designated as Arab. This procedure assigns an ethnicity to roughly 95% of private litigants. The fact that the share of names that are not assigned an ethnicity is very small is consistent with the fact that in Israel there is little overlap in naming conventions across ethnicities and there are virtually no marriages across ethnic lines.[[2]](#footnote-2) To assign ethnicity to the remaining litigants we search for their names in an electronic directory service. This allows us to locate the exact addresses of people bearing these names. Relying on the fact that in Israel Arabs and Jews tend to live in different communities (either different towns and villages, or different neighborhoods within integrated towns), we are able to assign ethnicities to almost all litigants. The few remaining cases are not coded.

1. **Data on exposure to violence**

To measure the intensity of violence we collect data on all Palestinian politically motivated fatal attacks inside Israel (i.e., excluding the Occupied Territories).[[3]](#footnote-3) For each attack we have information about date, location, and number of civilian fatalities. We also collect data on civilian fatalities inside Israel during the Second Lebanon War of 2006 to be able to control for possible effects of this conflict. Our fatality dataset uses information from several sources: B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories; the Israeli National Insurance Institute; and the Israeli Ministry of Defense.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Our first set of measures of exposure to violence is at the level of the court. These measures are based on the number of fatalities from attacks that occurred in the vicinity of the court during the conflict period. Vicinity is defined by three alternative geographical units, defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The first is the *natural area* which is the smallest geographical unit around the court. Our data span 24 natural areas, with an average population of around 230 thousand. Two of the 25 courts in our data are located in the same natural area. The two other geographical units are the *sub-district* and the *district* (average population is about 460 thousand per sup-district and 1.1 million per district). Our data spans 15 sub-districts, and 6 districts (shown in Figure 1 in the body of the paper).

Our second set of measures of exposure to violence is at the level of the judge. We compile information on employment history since 2000 for each judge in our dataset. The procedure relies on three main sources. The first is the official biographies mentioned above. These typically list the specific courts in which the judge served after being sworn in. The biographies also provide some information on employment prior to becoming a judge, in the private or public sector. The latter type of information is usually not detailed (e.g., “lawyer in a private firm”) and, importantly, does not always include place of employment. Our second data source is the lists of lawyers published annually by the Israel Bar Association.[[5]](#footnote-5) The list includes virtually all members of the association. For most of the members, it provides information about place of employment. Both the official biographies and the list of lawyers provide annual location data. The third source we use is a commercial computerized archive of judicial decisions in Israel.[[6]](#footnote-6) The archive provides us with information about dates and locations of trials in which our judges participated, either as judges or representing litigants. This complements the information available from the first two sources.

The procedure yields monthly location data for the entire Intifada period for 196 (82%) of the 240 judges in our sample. For an additional 37 (15%) of the judges we have partial information (i.e., we have location information for only part of the conflict period) and for 7 judges we have no location information whatsoever for the conflict period. Merging the location information with the fatalities data yields a measure of the number of fatalities each judge was exposed to in her place of employment in each month of the conflict. From this measure we construct three variables: (1) mean monthly exposure to fatalities in the natural area of the judge’s place of employment during the entire conflict period; (2) maximum exposure in a given month; (3) mean monthly exposure during the last year of the conflict (2004).

1. **Summary statistics**

Tables A1-A3 provide summary statistics by cases (A1 and A2) and judges (A3) for the conflict and post-conflict periods. Table A1 shows case characteristics. As mentioned above, around 73% of the claims are accepted in both periods. Net monetary transfers rose from about NIS 3,100 to roughly NIS 4,200 while legal expenses remained roughly the same, at around NIS 180. On average, plaintiffs obtained 80% of the compensation they requested in the first period; the monetary yield declined to 70% in the second period. In terms of case characteristics, traffic accidents account for about two-thirds of the cases in both periods, although this proportion is somewhat lower in the post-conflict period (61% vs. 69%). The share of cases with missing information about the subject of the claim increased from 15% to 23% in the post-conflict period. Some documents note that the ruling was given under a condition of “no defense.” This means either that no defense statement was submitted or that the defendant(s) failed to appear in court (it is not possible to distinguish between these two possibilities). This happened in 13% of the cases in the conflict period and 19% in the post-conflict period (with the others coded “defense present”). In both periods, a counterclaim was filed by the defense in roughly 9% of the cases. There is usually only one plaintiff in a case, but often more than one defendant. In both periods almost all cases were filed by private plaintiffs while the share of private litigants out of the total number of defendants is around 73%. The vast majority of litigants are male. Monetary compensation requested rose from about NIS 6,400 in the conflict period to approximately NIS 8,000 in the post-conflict period; note, however, that information on this variable is available only for 660 cases in the conflict period and 510 in the post-conflict period.

Table A2 reports the various measures of court exposure to violence. The first three rows show the average (per case) number of fatalities in the vicinity of the court in the year preceding the trial. The numbers demonstrate again the sharp decline in violence between the conflict period and the post-conflict period. The next six rows show descriptive statistics for court exposure during the conflict period: the first three years and the entire period. The differences here are much smaller and reflect compositional changes: in the post-conflict period a somewhat smaller share of cases come from the high-violence courts. This is important to keep in mind when comparing the conflict and the post-conflict periods: cases in the post-conflict period are not drawn from courts that experienced more violence.

Table A3 shows judge characteristics. The share of Arab judges increased from 11% to 16% from the conflict period to the post-conflict period. On average, judges in these courts are about 48 years old with five to seven years of tenure. About half of the judges are male. Approximately 20% were born outside of Israel. It is also noteworthy that the share of judges with advanced degrees increases across periods. The bottom part of the table reports judges’ personal exposure to violence during the conflict. The average (across judges) of the mean monthly number of fatalities a judge was exposed to during the conflict (in the natural area of the judge’s place of employment) is about 1. This is true for judges in both periods. The maximal number of fatalities a judge was exposed to in a given month is fourteen on average (and ranges from 0 to 30). Finally, the mean monthly number of fatalities a judge (in both periods) was exposed to during the last year of the conflict is around 0.3 on average.

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| **TABLE A1: Summary Statistics** |
| **Case Characteristics (N=3,153)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|   |   |   | Mean |  Difference |
|   |   |   | 2000–2004 (1) | 2007–2010(2) |  (3) |
| Claim outcome |   | Claim accepted | 0.734 | 0.724 | -0.010 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.016] |
|  |  |  -partly accepted | 0.530 | 0.482 | -0.048\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.018] |
|  |  | Net monetary compensation | 3,079 | 4,165 | 1,086\*\*\* |
|  |  | (3,924) | (5,325) | [165] |
|  |  | Net legal expenses | 188.8 | 178.0 | -10.8 |
|  |  |  | (497.1) | (511.2) | [18.0] |
|  |  | Monetary yield1 | 0.799 | 0.690 | -0.109\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.427) | (0.577) | [0.029] |
| Case characteristics | Claim Subject | Breach of sales contract | 0.032 | 0.038 | 0.006 |
|  |  | [0.007] |
|  |  | Breach of service contract | 0.095 | 0.081 | -0.014 |
|  |  |  |  | [0.010] |
|  |  | Housing-related | 0.011 | 0.012 | 0.001 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.004] |
|  |  | Private conflict | 0.013 | 0.014 | 0.001 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.004] |
|  |  | Traffic accident | 0.689 | 0.613 | -0.077\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.017] |
|  |  | Miscellaneous | 0.013 | 0.012 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.004] |
|  |  | Missing | 0.147 | 0.229 | 0.082\*\*\* |
|  |   |   |  |  | [0.014] |
|  | Defense | Defense present | 0.866 | 0.811 | -0.055\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.013] |
|  |   | Defense made a counterclaim  | 0.088 | 0.095 | 0.007 |
|  |  | [0.010] |
|  | Number of litigants | Plaintiffs | 1.113 | 1.137 | 0.024\*\* |
|  |  | (0.318) | (0.350) | [0.012] |
|  |  | Defendants | 1.724 | 1.757 | 0.032 |
|  |   |   | (0.713) | (0.754) | [0.026] |
|  | Private litigants (share of total)  | Plaintiffs | 0.998 | 0.996 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.031) | (0.043) | [0.001] |
| Defendants  | 0.737 | 0.730 | -0.007 |
|  | (0.258) | (0.258) | [0.009] |
|  | Male litigants(share of private)  | Plaintiffs | 0.821 | 0.812 | -0.009 |
|  |  | (0.364) | (0.370) | [0.013] |
|  | Defendants | 0.875 | 0.844 | -0.030\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.313) | (0.342) | [0.012] |
|  | Compensation requested1 | 6,424 | 7,952 | 1,528\*\*\* |
|   |   |   | (5,085) | (6,529) | [340] |
| *Notes*: 1 Data on compensation requested by plaintiff/s and on monetary yield are available for 1,170 cases. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (1)–(2). Standard errors in brackets in column (3). \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

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| **TABLE A2: Summary Statistics** |
| **Fatalities (N=3,153)** |
|  |
|  Time window | Geographical area | Mean |  Difference |
|  |  | 2000–2004(1) | 2007–2010(2) | (3) |
|  Previous year | Natural area | 0.115 | 0.001 | -0.114\*\*\* |
|  | (0.167) | (0.008) | [0.004] |
| Sub-District | 0.132 | 0.002 | -0.130\*\*\* |
|  | (0.161) | (0.009) | [0.004] |
| District | 0.212 | 0.003 | -0.209\*\*\* |
|  | (0.186) | (0.009) | [0.005] |
| First 3 years ofconflict period | Natural area | 0.402 | 0.351 | -0.050\*\*\* |
|  | (0.455) | (0.427) | [0.016] |
| Sub-District | 0.462 | 0.411 | -0.051\*\*\* |
|  | (0.418) | (0.393) | [0.015] |
| District | 0.776 | 0.735 | -0.041\*\*\* |
|  | (0.439) | (0.419) | [0.015] |
| Entire conflictperiod | Natural area | 0.421 | 0.362 | -0.059\*\*\* |
|  | (0.486) | (0.455) | [0.017] |
| Sub-District | 0.484 | 0.422 | -0.062\*\*\* |
|  | (0.448) | (0.422) | [0.016] |
| District | 0.806 | 0.748 | -0.058\*\*\* |
|  | (0.442) | (0.436) | [0.016] |
| *Notes*: Number of civilian fatalities divided by 100. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (1)–(2). Standard errors in brackets in column (3). \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

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| **TABLE A3: Summary Statistics** |
| **Judges (N=240)** |
|  |  |  |
|  | Mean | Difference |
|  | 2000–2004(1) | 2007–2010(2) | (3) |
| Arab | 0.114 | 0.157 | 0.043 |
|  |  |  | [0.040] |
| Age | 48.368 | 49.151 | 0.784 |
|  | (9.478) | (9.248) | [1.090] |
| Tenure at job | 4.959 | 7.236 | 2.277\*\*\* |
|  | (6.432) | (5.945) | [0.719] |
| Male | 0.538 | 0.494 | -0.044 |
|  |  |  | [0.058] |
| Immigrant (Jewish) | 0.205 | 0.175 | -0.030 |
|  |  |  | [0.046] |
| LLB degree from: |  |  |  |
| - Hebrew U. | 0.447 | 0.434 | -0.013 |
|  |  |  | [0.058] |
| - Tel-Aviv U. | 0.386 | 0.307 | -0.079 |
|  |  |  | [0.055] |
| - Bar Ilan U. | 0.129 | 0.151 | 0.022 |
|  |  |  | [0.041] |
| - Other institutions | 0.038 | 0.108 | 0.071\*\* |
|  |  |  | [0.031] |
| Highest degree is: |  |  |  |
| - LLB | 0.818 | 0.681 | -0.137\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | [0.051] |
| - Master | 0.152 | 0.277 | 0.126\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | [0.048] |
| - Doctoral | 0.030 | 0.042 | 0.012 |
|  |  |  | [0.022] |
| Personal exposure to violence during conflict: |  |  |  |
| - Mean1 | 0.985 | 1.086 | 0.101 |
|  | (1.168) | (1.202) | [0.140] |
| - Maximum2 | 14.106 | 14.208 | 0.101 |
|  | (10.747) | (10.501) | [1.250] |
| - Late3 | 0.319 | 0.283 | -0.035 |
|  | (0.649) | (0.571) | [0.072] |
| *N* | 132 | 166 |  |
| *Notes*: 1 mean monthly exposure to civilian fatalities in judge’s place of employment between 9/2000–12/2004; 2 maximum exposure in a given month; 3 mean monthly exposure between 1/2004–12/2004; see text for details. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (1)–(2). Standard errors in brackets in column (3).\*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

**Appendix B: Cases Withdrawn or Settled Outside the Court**

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| **TABLE B1** |
|  |  | Withdrawn |  | Settled Outside the Court |
|  |  | (1) | (2) |  | (3) | (4) |
| Arab plaintiff |  | 0.004 | 0.014 |  | 0.014 | 0.018 |
|  |  | (0.010) | (0.013) |  | (0.017) | (0.025) |
| Arab judge\*Arab plaintiff |  | -0.019 | -0.034\* |  | -0.019 | -0.037 |
|  |  | (0.014) | (0.018) |  | (0.021) | (0.031) |
| Arab plaintiff\*Court exposure |  |  | -0.021 |  |  | -0.007 |
|  |  |  | (0.019) |  |  | (0.028) |
| Arab judge\*Court exposure |  |  | 0.014 |  |  | 0.073 |
|  |  |  | (0.268) |  |  | (0.180) |
| Arab plaintiff\*Arab judge\*Court exposure |  |  | 0.044 |  |  | 0.076 |
|  |  |  | (0.035) |  |  | (0.056) |
| Observations |  | 3,432 | 3,432 |  | 3,451 | 3,451 |
| R-squared |  | 0.316 | 0.316 |  | 0.284 | 0.285 |
| *Notes*: The table follows the methodology of equations (2) and (3) in the body of the paper. In columns 1–2 the dependent variable is an indicator for cases withdrawn by the plaintiff. The sample includes cases decided by a judge or withdrawn. In column 3-4 the dependent variable is an indicator for cases settled outside the court. The sample includes cases decided by a judge or settled outside the court. Court exposure is the cumulative number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the court during the conflict period (divided by 100). Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include court fixed effects, judge fixed effects and judge tenure, case characteristics, and time controls. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; monetary compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); an indicator for “defense present”; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counterclaim. Time controls include indicators for year, month, and day of week.\*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

**Appendix C: Balancing tests**

Our identification assumption in Section 4 of the paper is that given the court, the ethnicity of the plaintiff, and the ethnicity of the judge, cases assigned to a judge of the same ethnicity as the plaintiff are not systematically different from cases assigned to a judge of a different ethnicity. Recall that we allow plaintiffs from different ethnicities to file cases with different (observed or unobserved) characteristics. We also allow judges of different ethnicities to receive cases with different (observed or unobserved) characteristics. Table C1 below evaluates the validity of our identification assumption using the observed case characteristics.

The first column shows mean characteristics for cases assigned to a judge of the same ethnicity as the plaintiff. Column 2 shows these figures for cases where the judge and the plaintiff are from different ethnic groups. Column 3 shows the simple difference in means. While most of these differences are small in size, a few are statistically significant. This, however, may be due to systematic differences in case characteristics across plaintiffs of different ethnicities. For example, Arab plaintiffs are more likely than Jewish plaintiffs to be male. Since most judges are Jewish, Arab plaintiffs are also more likely than Jewish plaintiffs to be assigned a judge of the other ethnicity. As a result, the proportion of male plaintiffs is higher in different-ethnicity cases (column 2) than in same-ethnicity cases (column 1). However, once we control for the ethnicity of the plaintiff, the difference between same-ethnicity and different-ethnicity cases in fact vanishes (not shown). Similarly, differences across courts or across judges of different ethnicities may yield differences in mean characteristics across same- and different-ethnicity cases. In column 4, we therefore show the difference in case characteristics controlling for judge ethnicity, plaintiff ethnicity, and court fixed effects. Consistent with our identification assumption, column 4 shows little evidence of systematic differences. A broadly similar picture emerges when separately examining the conflict period and the post-conflict period, see Tables C2 and C3 below.

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| **TABLE C1: Balancing Tests for the Assignment of Cases: 2000–2010** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Mean |  | Difference in means |  | Obs. |
|  |  | Same ethnicity | Different ethnicity |  | Withoutcontrols | With court FE, judge & plaintiff ethnicity |  |  |
|  |  | (1) | (2) |  | (3) | (4) |  | (5) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of plaintiffs |  | 1.125 | 1.121 |  | 0.005 | -0.003 |  | 3,153 |
|  |  | (0.333) | (0.333) |  | [0.012] | [0.013] |  |  |
| Number of defendants |  | 1.722 | 1.762 |  | -0.04 | 0.021 |  | 3,153 |
|  |  | (0.723) | (0.744) |  | [0.026] | [0.029] |  |  |
| Private plaintiffs (share of total) |  | 0.998 | 0.997 |  | 0.001 | 0.001 |  | 3,153 |
|  |  | (0.035) | (0.039) |  | [0.001] | [0.001] |  |  |
| Private defendants (share of total) |  | 0.737 | 0.729 |  | 0.008 | -0.018\* |  | 3,153 |
|  |  | (0.26) | (0.255) |  | [0.009] | [0.010] |  |  |
| Male plaintiffs (share of private plaintiffs) |  | 0.782 | 0.866 |  | -0.084\*\*\* | -0.015 |  | 3,153 |
|  |  | (0.392) | (0.322) |  | [0.013] | [0.014] |  |  |
| Male defendants (share of private defendants) |  | 0.892 | 0.819 |  | 0.072\*\*\* | 0.001 |  | 3,153 |
|  |  | (0.294) | (0.363) |  | [0.012] | [0.013] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Breach of sales contract |  | 0.037 | 0.031 |  | 0.006 | 0.004 |  | 3,153 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.007] | [0.007] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Breach of service contract |  | 0.091 | 0.086 |  | 0.005 | 0.008 |  | 3,153 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.01] | [0.011] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Housing related |  | 0.015 | 0.007 |  | 0.008\*\* | 0.007 |  | 3,153 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.004] | [0.004] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Private conflict |  | 0.013 | 0.014 |  | -0.001 | -0.002 |  | 3,153 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.004] | [0.005] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Traffic accident |  | 0.636 | 0.682 |  | -0.046\*\*\* | -0.004 |  | 3,153 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.017] | [0.018] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Miscellaneous |  | 0.013 | 0.012 |  | 0.001 | -0.001 |  | 3,153 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.004] | [0.004] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Missing |  | 0.195 | 0.167 |  | 0.028\*\* | -0.011 |  | 3,153 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.014] | [0.015] |  |  |
| Defense present |  | 0.828 | 0.86 |  | -0.033\*\* | 0.000 |  | 3,153 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.013] | [0.014] |  |  |
| Defense made a counterclaim |  | 0.074 | 0.115 |  | -0.041\*\*\* | -0.025\*\* |  | 3,153 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.01] | [0.012] |  |  |
| Compensation requested |  | 7,173 | 6,963 |  | 210 | -148 |  | 1,170 |
|  |  | (5,927) | (5,621) |  | [347] | [378] |  |  |
| *Notes*: “Same ethnicity”=judge and plaintiff are of same ethnicity. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (1)–(2). Standard errors in brackets in columns (3)–(4). Each entry in columns (3)–(4) is derived from a separate OLS regression where the explanatory variable is an indicator for same ethnicity of judge and plaintiff. Column (3) includes no controls and column (4) controls for judge ethnicity, plaintiff ethnicity, and court fixed effects. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

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| **TABLE C2: Balancing Tests for the Assignment of Cases: 2000–2004** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Mean |  | Difference in means |  | Obs. |
|  |  | Same ethnicity | Different ethnicity |  | Withoutcontrols | With court FE, judge & plaintiff ethnicity |  |  |
|  |  | (1) | (2) |  | (3) | (4) |  | (5) |
| Number of plaintiffs |  | 1.119 | 1.104 |  | 0.015 | 0.011 |  | 1748 |
|  |  | (0.324) | (0.31) |  | [0.015] | [0.017] |  |  |
| Number of defendants |  | 1.722 | 1.727 |  | -0.004 | 0.044 |  | 1748 |
|  |  | (0.712) | (0.715) |  | [0.034] | [0.037] |  |  |
| Private plaintiffs (share of total ) |  | 0.998 | 0.998 |  | 0.001 | 0.001 |  | 1748 |
|  |  | (0.027) | (0.035) |  | [0.002] | [0.002] |  |  |
| Private defendants (share of total) |  | 0.736 | 0.739 |  | -0.003 | -0.029\*\* |  | 1748 |
|  |  | (0.261) | (0.255) |  | [0.012] | [0.013] |  |  |
| Male plaintiffs (share of private plaintiffs) |  | 0.787 | 0.867 |  | -0.080\*\*\* | -0.019 |  | 1748 |
|  |  | (0.390) | (0.321) |  | [0.018] | [0.019] |  |  |
| Male defendants (share of private defendants) |  | 0.899 | 0.842 |  | 0.057\*\*\* | -0.004 |  | 1748 |
|  |  | (0.287) | (0.342) |  | [0.015] | [0.016] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Breach of sales contract |  | 0.035 | 0.028 |  | 0.007 | 0.004 |  | 1748 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.009] | [0.009] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Breach of service contract |  | 0.096 | 0.093 |  | 0.003 | 0.004 |  | 1748 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.014] | [0.015] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Housing related |  | 0.015 | 0.005 |  | 0.010\* | 0.009 |  | 1748 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.005] | [0.005] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Private conflict |  | 0.013 | 0.013 |  | 0.000 | -0.001 |  | 1748 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.006] | [0.006] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Traffic accident |  | 0.677 | 0.705 |  | -0.028 | 0.014 |  | 1748 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.022] | [0.023] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Miscellaneous |  | 0.014 | 0.011 |  | 0.003 | 0.001 |  | 1748 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.005] | [0.006] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Missing |  | 0.149 | 0.144 |  | 0.005 | -0.030\* |  | 1748 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.017] | [0.017] |  |  |
| Defense present |  | 0.863 | 0.871 |  | -0.008 | 0.030\* |  | 1748 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.016] | [0.016] |  |  |
| Defense made a counterclaim |  | 0.077 | 0.103 |  | -0.026\* | -0.010 |  | 1748 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.014] | [0.015] |  |  |
| Compensation requested |  | 6,573 | 6,214 |  | 359 | 189 |  | 660 |
|  |  | (5,281) | (4,798) |  | [402] | [447] |  |  |
| *Notes*: “Same ethnicity”=judge and plaintiff are of same ethnicity. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (1)–(2). Standard errors in brackets in columns (3)–(4). Each entry in columns (3)–(4) is derived from a separate OLS regression where the explanatory variable is an indicator for same ethnicity of judge and plaintiff. Column (3) includes no controls and column (4) controls for judge ethnicity, plaintiff ethnicity, and court fixed effects. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

|  |
| --- |
| **TABLE C3: Balancing Tests for the Assignment of Cases: 2007–2010** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Mean |  | Difference in means |  | Obs. |
|  |  | Same ethnicity | Different ethnicity |  | Withoutcontrols | With court FE, judge & plaintiff ethnicity |  |  |
|  |  | (1) | (2) |  | (3) | (4) |  | (5) |
| Number of plaintiffs |  | 1.133 | 1.142 |  | -0.010 | -0.027 |  | 1405 |
|  |  | (0.343) | (0.360) |  | [0.019] | [0.022] |  |  |
| Number of defendants |  | 1.721 | 1.807 |  | -0.086\*\* | -0.013 |  | 1405 |
|  |  | (0.736) | (0.778) |  | [0.041] | [0.047] |  |  |
| Private plaintiffs (share of total ) |  | 0.996 | 0.996 |  | 0.000 | 0.002 |  | 1405 |
|  |  | (0.042) | (0.044) |  | [0.002] | [0.003] |  |  |
| Private defendants (share of total) |  | 0.739 | 0.716 |  | 0.022 | 0.001 |  | 1405 |
|  |  | (0.260) | (0.254) |  | [0.014] | [0.016] |  |  |
| Male plaintiffs (share of private plaintiffs) |  | 0.775 | 0.865 |  | -0.089\*\*\* | -0.014 |  | 1405 |
|  |  | (0.395) | (0.323) |  | [0.020] | [0.023] |  |  |
| Male defendants (share of private defendants) |  | 0.882 | 0.789 |  | 0.093\*\*\* | 0.007 |  | 1405 |
|  |  | (0.301) | (0.387) |  | [0.018] | [0.021] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Breach of sales contract |  | 0.040 | 0.035 |  | 0.005 | 0.003 |  | 1405 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.010] | [0.012] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Breach of service contract |  | 0.084 | 0.076 |  | 0.008 | 0.015 |  | 1405 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.015] | [0.017] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Housing related |  | 0.014 | 0.009 |  | 0.006 | 0.003 |  | 1405 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.006] | [0.007] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Private conflict |  | 0.013 | 0.016 |  | -0.002 | -0.003 |  | 1405 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.006] | [0.007] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Traffic accident |  | 0.586 | 0.651 |  | -0.065\*\* | -0.035 |  | 1405 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.026] | [0.029] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Miscellaneous |  | 0.011 | 0.014 |  | -0.003 | -0.002 |  | 1405 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.006] | [0.007] |  |  |
| Claim subject - Missing |  | 0.251 | 0.198 |  | 0.053\*\* | 0.021 |  | 1405 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.023] | [0.024] |  |  |
| Defense present |  | 0.785 | 0.847 |  | -0.062\*\*\* | -0.045\*\* |  | 1405 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.021] | [0.023] |  |  |
| Defense made a counter claim |  | 0.070 | 0.130 |  | -0.060\*\*\* | -0.043\*\* |  | 1405 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.016] | [0.018] |  |  |
| Compensation requested |  | 7,895 | 8,049 |  | -154 | -566 |  | 510 |
|  |  | (6,557) | (6,498) |  | [599] | [641] |  |  |
| *Notes*: “Same ethnicity”=judge and plaintiff are from same ethnicity. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (1)–(2). Standard errors in brackets in columns (3)–(4). Each entry in columns (3)–(4) is derived from a separate OLS regression where the explanatory variable is an indicator for same ethnicity of judge and plaintiff. Column (3) includes no controls and column (4) controls for judge ethnicity, plaintiff ethnicity, and court fixed effects. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

**Appendix D: Ethnic Bias - Alternative Outcome Measures**

|  |
| --- |
| **TABLE D1** |
|  |
| **Panel A: All Observations** |
|  |  | Claim Outcome{0,1,2} |  | Net MonetaryCompensation |  | Net LegalExpenses |  | MonetaryYield |
|  |  | Conflict | Post-conflict |  | Conflict | Post-conflict |  | Conflict | Post-conflict |  | Conflict | Post-conflict |
|  |  | (1) | (2) |  | (3) | (4) |  | (5) | (6) |  | (7) | (8) |
| Arab plaintiff |  | -0.369\*\*\* | -0.537\*\*\* |  | -662\*\*\* | -1,144\*\*\* |  | -135\*\* | -174\*\* |  | -0.052 | -0.178\*\* |
|  |  | (0.107) | (0.103) |  | (249) | (305) |  | (54) | (71) |  | (0.041) | (0.073) |
| Arab judge\*Arab plaintiff |  | 0.587\*\*\* | 0.595\*\*\* |  | 926\*\* | 391 |  | 224\*\*\* | 153\* |  | 0.101\* | 0.163\* |
|  |  | (0.151) | (0.142) |  | (448) | (635) |  | (85) | (79) |  | (0.059) | (0.087) |
| Observations |  | 1,748 | 1,405 |  | 1,748 | 1,404 |  | 1,748 | 1,405 |  | 660 | 510 |
| R-squared/Pseudo R-squared |  | 0.401 | 0.313 |  | 0.430 | 0.315 |  | 0.229 | 0.344 |  | 0.568 | 0.497 |
|  |
| **Panel B: Excluding Outliers** |
| Arab plaintiff |  |  |  |  | -615\*\* | -1,072\*\*\* |  | -91\*\*\* | -151\*\* |  | -0.049 | -0.136\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (251) | (214) |  | (30) | (60) |  | (0.045) | (0.056) |
| Arab judge\*Arab plaintiff |  |  |  |  | 824\* | 814 |  | 156\*\*\* | 121\* |  | 0.090 | 0.158\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (425) | (547) |  | (54) | (65) |  | (0.062) | (0.087) |
| Observations |  |  |  |  | 1,711 | 1,374 |  | 1,705 | 1,375 |  | 646 | 498 |
| R-squared |  |  |  |  | 0.384 | 0.308 |  | 0.263 | 0.262 |  | 0.548 | 0.629 |
| *Notes*: Columns 1–2 are estimated by Ordered Probit and columns 3–8 are estimated by OLS. Panel B excludes the top and bottom 1% of cases in terms of the outcome variable. In columns 1–2 the dependent variable takes the value of 0 if the claim was rejected, 1 if the claim was partly accepted, and 2 if the claim was fully accepted. In columns 3–4 the dependent variable is the net monetary compensation awarded by the judge to the plaintiff (compensation awarded to plaintiff minus compensation awarded to defendant). In columns 5–6 the dependent variable is the net legal expenses awarded by the judge to the plaintiff (expenses awarded to plaintiff minus expenses awarded to defendant). In columns 7–8 the dependent variable is the ratio between the net monetary compensation (including legal expenses) awarded by the judge to the plaintiff and the compensation requested by the plaintiff. All regressions include court fixed effects, judge fixed effects and judge tenure, case characteristics, and time controls. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; monetary compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for “defense present”; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counterclaim. Time controls include indicators for year, month, and day of week. In columns 7–8 the monetary compensation requested by the plaintiff is not included in the case characteristics. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses.\*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

**Appendix E: Is The Estimated Bias Due to Other Judge Characteristics?**

|  |
| --- |
| **TABLE E1** |
| Dependent variable: claim accepted |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Arab plaintiff | -0.140\*\*\* | -0.032 | -0.117\*\*\* | -0.108\*\*\* | -0.132\*\*\* | -0.127\*\*\* |
|  | (0.025) | (0.089) | (0.034) | (0.035) | (0.030) | (0.025) |
| Arab plaintiff\*Arab judge | 0.186\*\*\* | 0.164\*\*\* | 0.176\*\*\* | 0.175\*\*\* | 0.191\*\*\* | 0.182\*\*\* |
|  | (0.036) | (0.043) | (0.037) | (0.037) | (0.037) | (0.035) |
| Arab plaintiff\*Judge age |  | -0.002 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.001) |  |  |  |  |
| Arab plaintiff\*Judge tenure |  |  | -0.003 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.002) |  |  |  |
| Arab plaintiff\*Male judge |  |  |  | -0.061 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.038) |  |  |
| Arab plaintiff\*Judge HU |  |  |  |  | -0.022 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.034) |  |
| Arab plaintiff\*Judge>LLB |  |  |  |  |  | -0.114\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.053) |
| Observations | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 |
| R-squared | 0.220 | 0.221 | 0.221 | 0.221 | 0.220 | 0.221 |
| *Notes*: Analysis includes cases from both periods. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include court fixed effects, judge fixed effects and judge tenure, case characteristics, and time controls. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; monetary compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for “defense present”; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week. “Judge HU” and “Judge>LLB” are indicators for whether judge attained LLB at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and whether judge has a master or PhD degree, respectively.\*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

**Appendix F: Heterogeneity in Ethnic Bias**

|  |
| --- |
| **TABLE F1** |
| Dependent variable: claim accepted |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Arab plaintiff | -0.140\*\*\* | -0.061 | -0.119\*\*\* | -0.117\*\*\* | -0.127\*\*\* | -0.125\*\*\* |
|  | (0.025) | (0.093) | (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.033) | (0.025) |
| Arab plaintiff\*Arab judge | 0.186\*\*\* | 0.420 | 0.187\*\*\* | 0.199\*\*\* | 0.169\*\* | 0.175\*\*\* |
|  | (0.036) | (0.269) | (0.052) | (0.043) | (0.066) | (0.038) |
| Arab plaintiff\*Arab judge\*Judge age |  | -0.006 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.006) |  |  |  |  |
| Arab plaintiff\*Arab judge\*Judge tenure |  |  | -0.002 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.007) |  |  |  |
| Arab plaintiff\*Arab judge\*Male judge |  |  |  | -0.061 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.080) |  |  |
| Arab plaintiff\*Arab judge\*Judge HU |  |  |  |  | 0.043 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.077) |  |
| Arab plaintiff\*Arab judge\*Judge>LLB |  |  |  |  |  | 0.077 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.090) |
| Additional interactions | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 |
| R-squared | 0.220 | 0.221 | 0.221 | 0.221 | 0.220 | 0.221 |
| *Notes*: Analysis includes cases from both periods. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include court fixed effects, judge fixed effects and judge tenure, case characteristics, and time controls. For each judge characteristic *z*, “Additional interactions” include *ArabPlaintiff\*z* and (for time varying *z*’s) *ArabJudge\*z*. Case characteristics include: number of plaintiffs; number of defendants; share of private plaintiffs; share of private defendants; share of male plaintiffs; share of male defendants; monetary compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for “defense present”; and an indicator for cases where the defendant filed a counter-claim. Time controls include indicators for year, month and day of week. “Judge HU” and “Judge>LLB” are indicators for whether judge attained LLB at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and whether judge has a master or PhD degree, respectively.\*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

**Appendix G: Balancing Tests for the Assignment of Cases by Past Exposure to Violence, 2007–2010**

Our identification assumption in Sections 5 and 6 of the paper is that as local exposure to violence during the conflict period increases, cases assigned to a judge of the same ethnicity as the plaintiff do not become systematically different from cases assigned to a judge of a different ethnicity. Table G1 below examines this assumption with respect to observed case characteristics. For ease of interpretation, column 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the variables. Column 2 presents the results for court exposure (measured by the cumulative number of fatalities in the natural area of the court during the conflict period, divided by 100). Column 4 presents the results for personal exposure (measured by the mean monthly number of fatalities in the natural area of the judge’s place of employment during the conflict period).[[7]](#footnote-7) Each entry in columns 2 and 4 is derived from a separate OLS regression where the explanatory variables include court fixed effects, indicators for judge ethnicity, plaintiff ethnicity, and same ethnicity of judge and plaintiff, as well as the exposure variable fully interacted with the ethnicity indicators. The table reports the coefficient on the interaction term *Exposure\*SameEthnicity*. That is, we report the estimated $α\_{7} $from an equation of the form:

$characteristic\_{ijc}=α\_{0}+α\_{1}ArabPlaintiff\_{i}+α\_{2}ArabJudge\_{i}+α\_{3}SameEthnicity\_{i}+α\_{4}Exposure\_{c}+α\_{5}Exposure\_{c}\*ArabPlaintiff\_{i}+α\_{6}Exposure\_{c}\*ArabJudge\_{i}+α\_{7}Exposure\_{c}\*SameEthnicity\_{i}+δ\_{c}+ε\_{ijc}$

where $i$ indexes cases, $j$ indexes judges, and $c$ indexes courts. In column 4 we report the corresponding coefficient when exposure is at the personal ($j$) level.[[8]](#footnote-8) Overall, there is little evidence of a systematic relationship between exposure to violence during the conflict and post-conflict differences in case characteristics between cases assigned to same vs. other ethnicity judges.[[9]](#footnote-9)

|  |
| --- |
| **TABLE G1: Balancing Tests for the Assignment of Cases****by Past Exposure to Violence, 2007–2010** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Mean | CourtExposure | N | PersonalExposure | N |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Number of plaintiffs | 1.137 | 0.147\*\* | 1,405 | 0.084 | 1,322 |
|  | (0.35) | [0.061] |  | [0.057] |  |
| Number of defendants | 1.757 | 0.115 | 1,405 | -0.235\* | 1,322 |
|  | (0.754) | [0.129] |  | [0.123] |  |
| Private plaintiffs (share of total ) | 0.996 | 0.010 | 1,405 | 0 | 1,322 |
|  | (0.043) | [0.008] |  | [0.007] |  |
| Private defendants (share of total) | 0.730 | -0.068 | 1,405 | 0.046 | 1,322 |
|  | (0.258) | [0.044] |  | [0.041] |  |
| Male plaintiffs (share of private plaintiffs) | 0.812 | -0.085 | 1,405 | -0.048 | 1,322 |
|  | (0.370) | [0.063] |  | [0.060] |  |
| Male defendants (share of private defendants) | 0.844 | 0.104\* | 1,405 | 0.031 | 1,322 |
|  | (0.342) | [0.057] |  | [0.054] |  |
| Claim subject - Breach of sales contract | 0.038 | -0.012 | 1,405 | 0.004 | 1,322 |
|  |  | [0.033] |  | [0.031] |  |
| Claim subject - Breach of service contract | 0.081 | -0.016 | 1,405 | 0.026 | 1,322 |
|  |  | [0.047] |  | [0.044] |  |
| Claim subject - Housing-related | 0.012 | 0.002 | 1,405 | -0.001 | 1,322 |
|  |  | [0.019] |  | [0.018] |  |
| Claim subject - Private conflict | 0.014 | -0.005 | 1,405 | -0.027 | 1,322 |
|  |  | [0.021] |  | [0.020] |  |
| Claim subject - Traffic accident | 0.613 | 0.073 | 1,405 | -0.055 | 1,322 |
|  |  | [0.08] |  | [0.075] |  |
| Claim subject - Miscellaneous | 0.012 | 0.002 | 1,405 | 0.010 | 1,322 |
|  |  | [0.019] |  | [0.018] |  |
| Claim subject - Missing | 0.229 | -0.046 | 1,405 | 0.041 | 1,322 |
|  |  | [0.067] |  | [0.062] |  |
| Defense present | 0.811 | 0.166\*\*\* | 1,405 | 0.037 | 1,322 |
|  |  | [0.063] |  | [0.059] |  |
| Defense made a counter claim | 0.095 | 0.024 | 1,405 | -0.025 | 1,322 |
|  |  | [0.051] |  | [0.048] |  |
| Compensation requested | 7,952 | 998 | 510 | -489 | 472 |
|  | (6529) | [1,513] |  | [1379] |  |
| *Notes*: Standard deviations in parentheses in column (1). Standard errors in brackets in columns (2) and (4). Each entry in columns (2) and (4) is derived from a separate OLS regression where the explanatory variables include court fixed effects, indicators for judge ethnicity, plaintiff ethnicity, and same ethnicity of judge and plaintiff, as well as the exposure variable fully interacted with the ethnicity indicators. The table reports the coefficient on the interaction *Exposure\*SameEthnicity.* The exposure variable in columns 2–3 is the cumulative number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the court during the conflict period (divided by 100). The exposure variable in columns 4–5 is the mean monthly number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the judge’s place of employment during the conflict period. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

**Appendix H: Placebo Tests**

|  |
| --- |
| **TABLE H1: Is Bias Associated with Future Exposure to Violence?**Dependent variable: claim accepted |
|  |  | Natural area |  | Sub-district |  | District |
| Cases from |  | 2000–2003 | 2007–2010 |  | 2000–2003 | 2007–2010 |  | 2000–2003 | 2007–2010 |
|  |  | (1) | (2) |  | (3) | (4) |  | (5) | (6) |
| Arab plaintiff |  | -0.074\* | -0.166\*\*\* |  | -0.072\* | -0.167\*\*\* |  | -0.032 | -0.174\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.040) | (0.046) |  | (0.042) | (0.046) |  | (0.050) | (0.047) |
| Arab judge\*Arab plaintiff |  | 0.133\*\* | 0.187\*\*\* |  | 0.126\* | 0.169\*\*\* |  | 0.077 | 0.165\*\* |
|  |  | (0.059) | (0.058) |  | (0.074) | (0.064) |  | (0.080) | (0.064) |
| Arab plaintiff\*Arab judge\* |  | -0.892 | 2.026\*\*\* |  | -1.039 | 2.007\*\* |  | -0.373 | 0.996 |
|  Court exposure in 2004 |  | (0.900) | (0.675) |  | (0.797) | (1.008) |  | (0.451) | (0.950) |
| Observations |  | 1,159 | 1,405 |  | 1,159 | 1,405 |  | 1,159 | 1,405 |
| R-squared |  | 0.264 | 0.266 |  | 0.264 | 0.262 |  | 0.267 | 0.264 |
| *Notes*: Analysis includes cases from the period indicated in the column title. Court exposure is the number of civilian fatalities (divided by 100) in the vicinity (natural area/sub-district/district) of the court during 2004. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include the same set controls as in the corresponding columns of Table 4 in the body of the paper.\*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

|  |
| --- |
| **TABLE H2: Is Bias Associated with Exposure in the Following Year?**Cases from the conflict period (2000–2004)Dependent variable: claim accepted |
|  | NaturalArea | Sub-district | District |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Arab plaintiff | -0.103\*\*\* | -0.104\*\*\* | -0.098\*\* |
|  | (0.033) | (0.035) | (0.045) |
| Arab judge\*Arab plaintiff | 0.132\*\*\* | 0.112\*\* | 0.112\*\* |
|  | (0.042) | (0.046) | (0.055) |
| Arab plaintiff\*Arab judge\* | 0.697\*\*\* | 0.739\*\*\* | 0.475\*\* |
|  Court exposure in preceding year | (0.193) | (0.206) | (0.210) |
| Arab plaintiff\*Arab judge\* | -0.057 | -0.060 | -0.040 |
|  Court exposure in following year | (0.290) | (0.314) | (0.215) |
| Observations | 1,748 | 1,748 | 1,748 |
| R-squared | 0.251 | 0.251 | 0.251 |
| *Notes*: Court exposure is the number of civilian fatalities in the vicinity (natural area/sub-district/district) of the court in the year preceding/following the trial (divided by 100 for clarity). Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include the same set controls as in columns 1, 4 and 7 of Table 3 in the body of the paper, as well as the court exposure variables and their interactions with the *Arab plaintiff* and *Arab judge* indicators.\*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

**Appendix I: Judicial Bias and Violence in the Judge’s Future Location**

|  |
| --- |
| **TABLE I1**Cases from the conflict period (2000–2004)Dependent variable: claim accepted |
|  | (1) | (2) |
| Arab plaintiff | -0.079\*\* | -0.082\*\* |
|  | (0.037) | (0.041) |
| Arab judge\*Arab plaintiff | 0.124\*\* | 0.132\*\* |
|  | (0.048) | (0.053) |
| Arab plaintiff\*Arab judge\* | 0.609\*\*\* | 0.877\*\* |
|  Recent court exposure | (0.178) | (0.388) |
| Arab plaintiff\*Arab judge\* |  | -0.289 |
|  Recent court exposure in judge’s future location |  | (0.407) |
| Observations | 1,583 | 1,583 |
| R-squared | 0.252 | 0.252 |
| *Notes*: Recent court exposure is the number of civilian fatalities in the natural area of the court in the year preceding the trial (divided by 100 for clarity). Recent court exposure in judge’s future location is the number of fatalities in the preceding year in the natural area where the judge will work in the post-conflict period (divided by 100; see text for details). Regressions are estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are in parentheses. All regressions include the same set controls as in column 1 of Table 3 in the body of the paper, as well as the court exposure variables and their interactions with the *Arab plaintiff* and *Arab judge* indicators.\*, \*\*, \*\*\* represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. |

1. In our calculations below we assume that all litigants are either Arab or Jewish (without distinguishing between subgroups). According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, at the end of 2002 76.8% of the Israeli population were Jewish and 19.1% were Arab. The rest are classified as *other*: these are mostly immigrants from the Former Soviet Union who are not formally classified as Jewish. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For example, in the data derived from the Israel Population Registry, 62.5% of first names are exclusively Jewish (i.e. the empirical probability that the name is associated with an Arab citizen is zero). At the same time, 28.2% of first names are exclusively Arab (i.e. the empirical probability that the name is associated with an Arab citizen is one). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. We cannot use data on fatalities in the Occupied Territories since our identification strategy relies on variation in the intensity of ethnic violence in the vicinity of the courts or the judges’ places of employment. Our data contains only one case from a court located in the Occupied Territories (this case is dropped from the analyses). Furthermore, only one of the judges in our data was employed in the Occupied Territories during the conflict period, and only one case in our final data was handled by this judge. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The B’Tselem data cover fatalities from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and have been used in most previous studies of the conflict (see, e.g., Gould and Klor 2010). We use the National Insurance Institute and Ministry of Defense data to verify the B’Tselem data and to add information on fatalities from the Second Lebanon War. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The lists are included in *The Lawyer's Calendar* published annually by The Israel Bar Publishing House (from 2002 in collaboration with Martindale-Hubbell Israel). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Accessible at: http://www.nevo.co.il/. This archive does not cover the universe of rulings but is considered the most comprehensive. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Results are qualitatively similar when using the alternative measures of court and personal exposure mentioned above and used in Tables 3-6 in the body of the paper. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The un-interacted exposure variable is dropped in column 2 due to the inclusion of court fixed effects. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The main exception is that cases assigned to a judge of the same ethnicity as the plaintiff seem to have a higher proportion of “defense present” in courts that experienced more fatalities during the conflict (column 2, third-to-last row). Since defense presence lowers the probability of the claim being accepted (this is one of the unreported controls in Tables 2-6 in the body of the paper), then to the extent that “defense present” is positively correlated with unobservables that also lower the probability of a claim being accepted, this might bias downward our estimate of the effect of past exposure to violence on judicial ethnic bias. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)